We investigate the resilience of some classical mechanisms to alternative specifications of preferences and information structures. Specifically, we analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the only information a player i has about the profile of true valuations, θ * , consists of a set of distributions, from one of which θ * i has been drawn.
Introduction
We prove that some classical mechanisms are more robust than previously thought:
namely, that they guarantee desirable outcomes even when the players have no beliefs about their opponents, and very limited knowledge about themselves. In particular, we prove that the Vickrey mechanism enjoys such robustness.
The Vickrey mechanism efficiently allocates multiple identical goods by ensuring that it is a dominant strategy for each player i to report his true valuation θ * i . Being dominant-strategy truthful, this mechanism of course (1) works even when the players have no beliefs about their opponents, but also (2) assumes that each player knows his own true valuation precisely. In real life, however, a player i may be uncertain about his own θ * i , as it may depend on variables that are not directly observable by him. For example, in an auction for the exclusive right to a newly discovered oil well, a player's valuation may depend on the exact quality of the crude, on the likelihood that other oil wells will be discovered, on the political stability of the country where the well resides, etc.
Knightian Valuation Uncertainty. A simple way to capture a player i's uncertainty about his own valuation is the 'single-distribution' model, where i does not know θ * i , but only the true distribution D * i , over the set Θ i of all his possible valuations, from which θ nism, whether deterministic or randomized, can guarantee higher efficiency than that obtainable by allocating the good at random. Dominant-strategy mechanisms provide designers with the best guarantee that the players will choose the desired strategies. However, one may also be quite confident that a player will not choose a strategy outside his undominated set, and we prove that, no matter which undominated strategies the players might choose, the Vickrey mechanism is guaranteed to return an allocation of very high social welfare.
More precisely, Theorem 2 guarantees that, in the Knightian valuation model, the social-welfare performance of the Vickrey mechanism gracefully degrades with the uncertainty level of the players (naturally measured) and the number of copies of the good. Let us emphasize that this performance guarantee is proved without 'inertia'.
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Of course, the fact that the Vickrey mechanism performs well in undominated strategies does not exclude that different mechanisms may perform even better. Theorem 3, however, shows that the performance of the Vickrey mechanism is essentially optimal among all finite undominated-strategy mechanisms, probabilistic or not. Here, a mechanism is 'finite' if it assigns a finite set of strategies to each player.
Together, Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 show that the Vickrey mechanism is very robust to alternative specifications of preferences and information structures. We believe that such robustness is an important property of a mechanism. In our last section, we point out that this robustness is also enjoyed by additional, but not all, classical mechanisms. 4 As originally put forward by Bewley, the inertia assumption states that a player with incomparable options will chose a 'reference point' unless a strictly better alternative exists. (Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon rely on the inertia assumption when putting forward maximal incentive compatibility.) As we shall argue in our technical sections, in the Vickrey mechanism, a player i with k possible distributions for θ * i , D 1 , . . . , D k , has k natural reference points to report: namely, E[D 1 ], . . . , E[D k ], where each expectation E[D j ] is an m-dimensional vector if there are m copies of the good. Indeed, reporting each of these valuations is undominated, and when all the players report these reference points, the Vickrey mechanism performs well. However, these are not the only undominated strategies, and Theorem 2 guarantees that the Vickrey mechanism continues to perform well no matter which undominated strategy each player may report, without any behavioral assumptions.
Related Work
Knightian players have received much attention in decision theory. Aumann [Aum62] , Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok [DMO04] , Ok [Ok02] , and Nascimento [Nas11] investigate decision with incomplete orders of preferences. Various criteria for selecting a single distribution out of a set of distributions have been studied by Danan [Dan10] , Schmeidler [Sch89] , and Gilboa and Schmeidler [GS89] . (In fact, Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape [BOP06] and Bodoh-Creed [Bod12] use the model from [GS89] to study auctions.) General equilibrium models with incompletely ordered preferences have been considered by Mas-Colell [Mas74] , Gale and Mas-Colell [GM75] , Shafer and Sonnenschein [SS75] , and Fon and Otani [FO79] . More recently, Rigotti and Shannon [RS05] have characterized the set of equilibria in a financial market problem.
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Knightian mechanisms were first considered by Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon [LRS09] , for the rental extraction problem, in a model different from ours. In their model, there is a single player, whose Knightian uncertainty arises from a variable that he cannot observe, but is exactly known to the mechanism. More precisely, the player's utility for a given outcome depends on (a) his own type, t ∈ T , which the player knows exactly, and (b) the state of the world, s ∈ S, which only the mechanism knows exactly, while the player only knows that it is drawn from a distribution in some set Π(t) ⊆ ∆(S).
They proposed two notions of implementation in their Knightian model: optimal incentive compatibility and maximal incentive compatibility. Their first notion corresponds to our Knightian dominant-strategy truthfulness, but does not coincide with it, due to the difference between theirs and our model. 6 Their second notion 5 A strategy profile is an equilibrium if no player can deviate and strictly benefit no matter which distribution is picked from his set. Notice that such an equilibrium is not a notion of dominance.
6 Optimal incentive compatibility applies to mechanisms φ : T × S → O mapping the reported type of the player t ∈ T and the true state of the world s ∈ S to an outcome φ(t, s) ∈ O. Formally (see [LRS09, Definition 3]), such a mechanism φ is optimal incentive compatible if for all types t and all mixed strategies σ ∈ ∆(T ):
∀π ∈ Π(t). By contrast, we consider auctions with multiple players, so that to express Knightian dominance the strategy subprofiles of a player's opponents must be universally quantified. Moreover, and more importantly, our mechanisms have no information about the players' true valuations.
corresponds to a weaker version of our implementation of Knightian undominated strategies, and does not apply to the Vickrey mechanism in our model. 7 Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon also studied variants of their notions in a principal-agent model with Knightian uncertainty [LRS11] .
Implementation in (traditional) undominated strategies was originally proposed by Jackson [Jac92, JPS94] . An example of of such an implementation in the exactvaluation model is given by the mechanism of Babaioff et al. [BLP06] for efficiency in single-value multi-minded auctions.
3 Notation and Model
Notation for Multi-Unit Auctions
In a multi-unit auction there are identical copies of the same good. We denote by n the number of players, and by m the number of copies of the good. The set of all
n i=0 a i = m}. In an allocation A, A 0 is the number of unallocated copies and A i the number of copies allocated to player i.
The set of all possible valuation profiles is Θ = Θ 1 × · · · × Θ n . Throughout this paper, for each player i,
That is, we never assume any restrictions on the players' possible valuations, except for marginal valuations being non-increasing, the standard assumption envisaged by Vickrey. 8 The profile of the players' true valuations is θ * = (θ * 1 , . . . , θ * n ) ∈ Θ. The set of possible outcomes is Ω def = A × R n ≥0 . If (A, P ) ∈ Ω, we refer P i as the 7 In maximal incentive compatibility, truthful reporting is not strictly dominated, there may be additional undominated strategies, for which the mechanism may fail to produce a desired outcome. By contrast, in implementation in Knightian undominated strategies, a mechanism must produce a desired outcome no matter which undominated strategy each player may choose. Moreover, their notion applies only to 'Knightian direct' mechanisms, but not to the Vickrey mechanism in our model. Indeed, the Vickrey mechanism allows a player to report only a single valuation, while in our Knightian model a player has a set of possible valuations. Thus, he could not 'truthfully' report his candidate set even if he wanted.
8 Multi-unit auctions are sometimes referred to as Vickrey auctions (in particular, see Ausubel and Milgrom [AM06] ). Indeed, Vickrey was the first one to provide an efficient mechanism for such auctions [Vic61] , and his mechanism was later generalized to become the VCG mechanism. If a player i has a valuation θ i ∈ Θ i , then θ i (j) is his marginal value of receiving the j-th copy of the good. Non-decreasing marginal valuations in multi-unit auctions were indeed envisaged by Vickrey. price charged to player i. The utility of a player i, with valuation θ i , for an outcome
If ω is a distribution over outcomes, then U i (θ i , ω) is the expected utility of player i.
The social welfare of an outcome ω = (A, P ), and that of an allocation A, where A = (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n ), relative to a valuation profile θ, is SW(θ, ω) = SW(θ, A) = i a i j=1 θ i (j). The maximum social welfare relative to θ, MSW(θ), is max A∈A SW(θ, A).
The maximum social welfare is MSW = MSW(θ * ).
A mechanism M specifies, for each player i, a set S i . We interchangeably refer to each member of S i as a pure strategy/action/report of i, and similarly, a member of ∆(S i ) as a mixed strategy/action/report of i.
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After each player i, simultaneously with his opponents, reports a strategy s i in
Knightian Valuation Uncertainty
In our model, a player i's sole information about θ * consists of K i , a set of distributions over Θ i , from one of which θ * i has been drawn. (The true valuations are uncorrelated.) That is, K i is i's sole (and private) information about his own true valuation θ * i . Furthermore, for every opponent j, i has no information (or beliefs) about θ * j or K j . For auctions, because each Θ i is convex, this model has an equivalent, but nondistributional formulation.
Definition 3.1 (Knightian valuation model). For each player i, i's sole information about θ * is a set K i , the candidate (valuation) set of i, such that θ * i ∈ K i ⊂ Θ i . We refer to an element of K i as a candidate valuation.
The set of all possible candidate sets of a player i is
9 Often, in pre-Bayesian settings, the notion of a strategy and that of an action are distinct. Indeed, a strategy s i of a player i maps the set of all possible types of i to the set of i' possible actions/reports. But since strategies are universally quantified in all relevant definitions of this paper, we have no need to separate (and for simplicity refrain from separating) the notions of strategies and actions.
The reason behind the above equivalence is that, in auctions, given that all a player i cares about is his expected (quasi-linear) utility, he may 'collapse' each distribution
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In the Knightian valuation model, a mechanism's performance will of course depend on the inaccuracy of the players' candidate sets, which we measure as follows.
Definition 3.2. For all players i, candidate set K i , and copies j ∈ [m], we let
An auction is (at most) δ-approximate if the set of all possible candidate sets of a To make our results stronger, when proving that a mechanism performs well, we consider all possible candidate sets, including non convex ones. When proving that a mechanism performs poorly, we consider candidate sets that are convex.
10 For example, in a 2-unit auction, a player's valuation consists of a pair (v(1), v(2)) where v(1) ≥ v(2) ≥ 0. Suppose a player i knows that θ * i is drawn from a distribution D * i over such pairs. In addition, let (e 1 , e 2 ) def = E θi∼Di θ i (1), θ i (2) ∈ Θ i , and let ω be an outcome in which i wins exactly one copy of the good. Then, i's expected utility for ω is E θi∼Di [θ i (1)] − p = e 1 − p, as if his θ * i were (e 1 , e 2 ). Since this is true for every (even probabilistically chosen) outcome, i may very well act as if his true valuation were exactly θ * i = (e 1 , e 2 ). Let us now be more abstract. The desired equivalence could be formalized in three steps. Consider a player i only knowing a set of distributions K i from one of which θ * i has been drawn. In a first step, i can be identified with a player only knowing a multiset of valuations K i , containing his true valuation, if there exists a bijection φ :
In a second step, the latter player can be identified with a player only knowing a set of valuations K i , containing his true valuation and coinciding with K i after removing redundant valuations. In a third step, we choose φ to be the function mapping a distribution D to its expectation.
In the above proof sketch we rely on the fact that φ(
, which is indeed the case because Θ i is convex. The above equivalence thus holds not only for multi-unit auctions, but also for any auction where each Θ i is a convex set.
2. Beliefs. Assume that K i = {a, b}. Then, despite our prior remark, it may still be hard to accept that player i may know his true valuation to be either a or b, without forming some (even partial) beliefs. For instance, without exactly knowing the probabilities of a and b, i may believe that his true valuation is more probable to be a than b. Note, however, that this belief corresponds to the player having a set of distributions K i = {D p : p ∈ [0.5, 1]} where each D p is a distribution taking value a with probability p, and value b with probability 1 − p. Again, i may as well collapse each distribution D p to its expected value, so as to end up, de facto, with a set of candidate valuations:
In other words, candidate sets may be very expressive. When we say that the candidate set is K i , we assume that all (partial) beliefs that player i may have about his own valuation θ * i have already been taken into account.
3. Additive vs.Ṁultiplicative Inaccuracy. We could have measured Knightian uncertainty via a multiplicative, rather than additive, parameter δ. Although all results in this paper can be restated for a multiplicative δ (see Appendix D), the additive version provides the simplest proofs and is more meaningful. 11 For simplicity, consider a single-copy (i.e., single-good) auction. Here, the multiplicative version of the inaccuracy can be defined as follows. Let δ be in [0, 1] 
Suppose now that K 1 = [1000, 1010] and K 2 = [10, 20]. Then, the maximum social welfare of this auction is at least 1000, no matter what the true valuations of the two players might be. Using our additive definition, this auction is only 10-approximate, where 10 is small relative to the maximum social welfare. By contrast, using the multiplicative definition, the auction is 50%-approximate. That is, it has the same inaccuracy as when The richness of candidate sets makes the robustness of the Vickrey mechanism -that is Theorem 2-stronger. Moreover, as we shall see, it is crucial for our negative results -that is, for Theorems 1 and 3.
5. Social welfare. Note that the true social welfare of an outcome ω = (A, P ), that of an allocation A, and the true maximum social welfare continue to be SW(θ * , ω), SW(θ * , A), and MSW(θ * ), whether or not every player i knows θ * i exactly.
First Theorem
It is easy to see We thus state our first theorem in terms of Knightian DST mechanisms, which we define below.
Theorem 1. For all (possibly probabilistic) Knightian DST mechanisms M for single-good auctions, and for all δ > 0, there exist profiles K of δ-approximate candidate sets such that
Above, the expectation is over the possible random choices of the mechanism M .
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix B.
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12 Note that our proof of Theorem 1 continues to hold even when M is allowed to know δ in advance. In other words, the proof holds when M knows that every K i comes from K δ i . (The Knightian DST requirement can be easily weakened by a δ-DST requirement, where the mechanism only takes as input δ-approximate candidate sets.)
Here, we just wish to make three remarks.
1. Visualization of Bad Cases. To appreciate how intrinsically inadequate DST (and ex-post Nash) mechanisms are in single-good Knightian auctions, consider the following example.
Let n = 3, δ = 10, let M be any dominant-strategy (or ex-post Nash) mechanism, and let the players have the following δ-approximate candidate sets:
Case 2:
Case 3:
Then, when the players choose a profile of dominant (or ex-post Nash equilibrium) strategies, Claim B.2 shows that (a) if M is deterministic, then it must assign the good to a 'low-valuation player' for at least one of the three cases above; and (b) if M is probabilistic, then it must assign the good to the 'high-valuation player' with probability ≥ 1/3 for at least one of the three cases above.
2. Richness of Candidate Sets. In our model, where candidate sets are unconstrained, it is natural to require that a good mechanism must perform well for all possible candidate sets of the players.
13 Only for analyzing a mechanism's performance may we restrict our attention to δ-approximate candidate sets.
This richness of candidate sets is crucially relied upon by our proof of Theorem 1, but is not a limitation of our proof techniques. Indeed, if the players' possible candidate sets were sufficiently restricted, then dominant-strategy mechanisms could actually guarantee maximum social welfare. 
Intuition for Proving Theorem 1
Denote by M A i (K i , K −i ) the probability that player i wins the good in mechanism M when players report the profile (
The key point in our proof is to show that, for every
Fixing the choice of K −i , let us view all the candidate sets of player i as nodes in a graph, and connect two nodes K i and K i whenever they share two candidate valuations. If the player's candidate sets are rich enough so that this graph is connected, then the probability M A i ( · , K −i ) must be constant regardless of player i's report. From this, it immediately follows that M cannot guarantee non-trivial social welfare.
Second Theorem
We wish to prove that the social-welfare performance of the Vickrey mechanism gracefully degrades with δ, no matter which undominated strategies the players may choose.
Recall that the Vickrey mechanism, denoted by Vickrey, is a direct mechanism (i.e., satisfies S i = Θ i ) and maps a profile of valuations θ ∈ Θ 1 × · · · × Θ n , to an outcome (A, P ); where A ∈ arg max A∈A SW(θ, A),
, and possible ties are broken lexicographically.
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For the Knightian valuation model, in this section, we prove in Theorem 2 that Vickrey delivers high social welfare in (Knightian) undominated strategies, which we define below.
Definition 5.1. In a mechanism M , a pure strategy s i ∈ S i of a player i is (weakly) dominated by another possibly mixed strategy σ i ∈ ∆(S i ) of i with respect to his
We denote the set of such undominated strategies by
If K is a product or a profile of candidate sets, that is, if
Our notion of an undominated strategy intends to capture the 'weakest condition' for which s i should be discarded in favor of σ i . Note that it is a natural extension of its classical counterpart. In particular, we allow for the possibility of a pure strategy s i to be dominated by a mixed one σ i .
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Of course, other extensions are also possible. However, they either (1) fail to capture our intended 'weakest condition', (2) fail to coincide with the classical notion when players know their valuations exactly, or (3) are equivalent to ours under mild . In this game, Left is still dominated by '1/2 Middle + 1/2 Right', but not by Middle or Right alone.
conditions. 18 Finally, the difficulty of defining undominated strategies pointed out by Jackson [Jac92] does not apply to our paper.
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We are now ready to state our second theorem.
Theorem 2. In a m-unit Knightian auction, for all δ, all products K of δ-approximate candidate sets, all profiles v ∈ UD(K), and all θ ∈ K SW θ, Vickrey(v) ≥ MSW(θ) − 2mδ .
Intuition for Proving Theorem 2
The good social-welfare performance of the Vickrey mechanism follows from a structural lemma, Lemma 5.2, guaranteeing that, for all players i, all candidate sets K i , and all copies j:
It is immediate to see that this condition holds in the simpler case of a single-copy (i.e., single-good) auction, where the Vickrey mechanism coincides with the secondprice one. Indeed, assume that for some player i, K ⊥ i = a and K i = b. Then, it is easy to check that reporting any value greater than b (respectively, smaller than a) is (weakly) dominated by reporting precisely b (respectively, a).
18 Our extension desires to capture the 'weakest condition' for which s i should be discarded in favor of σ i . To express condition (2) in Definition 5.1, we must quantify the true valuation θ i ∈ K i and the pure strategy subprofile of i's opponents s −i ∈ S −i . There are three alternative possibilities to consider. Namely, (a) ∀θ i ∀s −i , (b) ∃θ i ∀s −i , and (c) ∀θ i ∃s −i . Alternatives (a) and (b) do not yield the classical notion of (weak) dominance when K i is a singleton. Alternative (c) fails to capture our desideratum. (Indeed, since σ i is already no worse than s i , for player i to discard strategy s i in favor of σ i , it should suffice that s i be strictly worse than σ i for a single possible valuation
Alternatively, one may also consider defining an undominated strategy in the spirit of an equilibrium notion in a pre-Bayesian game. Here, a strategy of player i is a function f i mapping i's candidate set K i to an action. Accordingly, a profile of strategies (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is 'undominated' if, for each player i, all K, and all θ i ∈ K i , there is no σ i such that
, where at least one inequality is strict. Note, however, that this notion coincides with ours if each strategy f i is onto. That is, if for every possible action s i , there exists some K i such that s i = f i (K i ). Also note that, in the case of the Vickrey mechanism, f i should be onto. Indeed, when K i is a singleton, K i = {s i }, player i should only want to play s i , and thus f i ({s i }) should coincide with s i .
19 As pointed out by Jackson [Jac92] in the exact-valuation case, the general notion of an undominated strategy is more complex. However, for bounded mechanisms, the simpler notion above coincides with the general notion, even in the Knightian setting. Since this class of mechanisms includes the Vickrey mechanism and all finite ones, we adopt this simpler notion for this paper.
Consider now the Vickrey mechanism in a multi-unit auction, and let a j = K ⊥ i (j) and b j = K i (j). Here, it is again intuitively clear that reporting a valuation v i such
is a dominated strategy for player i. However, i may consider some strategy v i that bids above b j for some copy j and below a k for some other copy k. Such a strategy v i is, in general, not dominated by "bidding b j for all j ∈ [m]" or "bidding a j for all j ∈ [m]". However, one can still carefully construct a strategy v * i that dominates v i . More specifically, we construct v * i from v i by changing only one, but carefully chosen, coordinate j * ∈ [m]. This allows us to argue that, for all v −i ∈ Θ −i , the
That is, if player i receives a different number of copies in these two outcomes, then it must be that i has received precisely j * copies in the first outcome, and precisely j * − 1 (or j * + 1) in the second. By taking into account the Vickrey prices, it becomes easy to conclude that v * i dominates v i .
A Structural Lemma
Let us now formally state and prove our structural lemma.
Lemma 5.2. In Vickrey, for each player i, candidate set K i , and copy j
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Recall that the Vickrey mechanism is direct, that is, S i = Θ i for all players i, and that multi-unit auctions have non-increasing marginal val-
That is, both K i and K ⊥ i are valid strategies in the Vickrey mechanism. We start by proving, by contradiction, that
(5.1)
Assume that implication (5.1) is false; let j * ∈ [m] be the first coordinate j such that 
Since v i and K ⊥ are monotonically non-increasing, so is v * i . Indeed,
Thus also v * i is a valid valuation in Θ i . We now reach a contradiction by showing that v * i weakly dominates v i , that is,
To show (5.2), choose arbitrarily v −i ∈ Θ −i , and consider the following two cases:
receives the same number of copies.
In this case, inequality (5.2) holds because its two sides are equal for all θ. (a) i's price for his extra j * -th copy of the good is ≤ K ⊥ (j * ).
Indeed, being dominant-strategy in the classical setting, Vickrey guarantees that i pays for his j * -th copy at most the value he reports for it. (b) i's value for this j * -th copy is ≥ K ⊥ (j * ).
Indeed, for any possible choice of
Therefore, inequality (5.2) holds. Let us now show that also inequality (5.3) holds.
To do so, we need to construct a 'witness' candidate valuation θ i ∈ K i and a 'witness' strategy sub-profile v −i . In fact, we will construct some v −i so that (5.
Then, player i wins exactly j An absolutely symmetrical argument shows that
(5.4) Together, statements (5.1) and (5.4) imply that Lemma 5.2 holds.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let v ∈ UD(K) be any profile of undominated strategies, and a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n represent the allocation in the outcome Vickrey(v), where each player i receives a i copies of the goods, and a 0 is the number of unallocated copies. For any θ ∈ K,
. . , b n represent the allocation that maximizes social welfare under θ, i.e., 21 In this symmetrical case, one needs to define j * ∈ [m] to be the last coordinate such that
≥ MSW(θ) − 2mδ.
Above
• Inequality (1) holds because by hypothesis θ ∈ K and accordingly θ i ( ) ≥
• Inequality (4) holds because the Vickrey mechanism maximizes social welfare with respect to v, and thus relative to v, (a 0 , . . . , a n ) is no worse than any other allocation, and in particular (b 0 , . . . , b n );
• Inequality (5) holds again by Lemma 5.2;
• Inequality (6) holds because by hypothesis θ ∈ K and accordingly θ i ( ) ≤ 
The Bound of Theorem 2 is Tight
Having established Theorem 2, let us now illustrate that its performance bound is actually tight by means of the following simple example.
Example 5.3. Consider the two-player δ-approximate auction in which, for some x > 0, the candidate sets are
In this case, the Vickrey mechanism may miss the maximum social welfare by 2δm as follows. Player 1 is 'optimistic' and bids the valuation v 1 = (x + δ, . . . , x + δ); player 2 is 'pessimistic' and bids v 2 = (x + δ, . . . , x + δ); the Vickrey mechanism (with the lexicographic tie-breaking rule) allocates all copies of the good to player 1; the true valuation θ * 1 of player 1 is (x, . . . , x); and the true valuation θ * 2 of player 2 is (x + 2δ, . . . , x + 2δ). Accordingly, the realized social welfare is xm, while the maximum one is xm+2mδ.
Third Theorem
Although the social welfare performance of the Vickrey mechanism, as guaranteed by Theorem 2, can be considered good, it is legitimate to wonder whether a different undominated-strategy mechanism might enjoy an even better performance.
Consider again Example 5.3. In principle, there may be another undominated strategy mechanism missing the maximum social welfare by at most δm. Indeed, even a mechanism M allowing each player to report a single valuation might be able to do so, if it ensures that the undominated strategies for player 1 (respectively, player 2) consist of bidding a value close to x + δ/2 (respectively, x + 3δ/2) for each copy.
More generally, there may exist an undominated-strategy mechanism that, allowing each player to report a set of valuations, guarantees social welfare ≥ MSW − δm, not only in the above example but in all δ-approximate multi-unit Knightian auctions.
Theorem 3, however, rules out the existence of such mechanisms, so long as they give each player a finite set of strategies. The optimality of the Vickrey mechanism relative to all finite mechanisms is significant, because in practice all mechanisms are finite, and because finite mechanisms may perform very well in Knightian auctions.
The latter mechanisms include not only the discretized Vickrey mechanism, 22 which elicits a single valuation from each player, but also more general mechanisms, which, 22 The Vickrey mechanism for an m-unit auction can be discretized by restricting each player i to report a valuation in
. (Indeed, one may prefer that all payments be made in cash, and thus ultimately in cents, rather than -sayimplemented via probabilistic lotteries.) Then, it is easy to check that Theorem 2 continues to hold with only an additive 0.01m loss in the social welfare guarantee, provided that no player valuation exceeds 10 20 . Since the discretized Vickrey mechanism performs well in undominated strategies, in principle finite mechanisms that are free to choose their outcome functions and strategy sets may perform even better. Thus, Theorem 3 highlights how clever the Vickrey mechanism really is.
in particular, may allow a player to report a subset of a finite set of valuations.
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Remark. We note that this is the only place in our paper where the mechanism is assumed to be finite. In Section 6.1, when providing intuition for Theorem 3, we highlight how the finiteness of the pure strategies spaces is relied upon in our proof.
Theorem 3. Let M be a finite mechanism in a δ-approximate multi-unit Knightian auction with n > 1 players and δ > 0.
24 Then, for every ε > 0, there exist products K of δ-approximate candidate sets, valuation profiles θ ∈ K, and undominated strategy profiles s ∈ UD(K), such that
Intuition for Proving Theorem 3
The key idea behind our proof is best illustrated when there is only one copy of the good for sale. In this special case, as in the general one, there are two main steps in the proof. Let M be a finite mechanism in a δ-approximate single-good Knightian auction.
In the first step (corresponding to our structural lemma 6.1), we show that if (a) two candidate sets K i and K i , of the same player i, overlap non-trivially, then (b) UD i (K i ) and UD i ( K i ) essentially have a common strategy.
23 For instance, a finite mechanism may also allow each player to report an arbitrary subset of F i , as defined in Footnote 22. Such a strategy space clearly enables each player to report, if he so wishes, a reasonable approximation to his own candidate set K i . For instance, in a single-good auction where i's true candidate set is K i = [100, 110], i would be able to report {100.00, 100.01, 100.02, . . . , 110.00}.
It should also be appreciated that a finite mechanism may allow each player to report an 'infinite object'. For instance, again in single-good auctions, although candidate sets may be arbitrary subsets of the reals, a finite mechanism may allow a player to report a set of intervals, overlapping or not, of the form [a, b], where a and b are multiples of 0.01 and less than 10 20 . In fact, there are finitely many such intervals. (Although each such [a, b] consists of infinitely many reals, it can be reported by means of its two extreme points, that is, by means of two numbers of at most 22 decimal digits.) Of course, each player i should pay close attention to his K i and to the outcome function of the mechanism, in order to choose which of these finitely many intervals to report.
24 Note that M may be probabilistic, and may even know δ in advance. The latter point is important because in a single-good auction one expects the distance between every two valuations of the same K i to be upper-bounded by a small value δ, which would therefore be de facto known to an auction mechanism.
In the case of a single good auction, property (a) means that K i ∩ K i has at least two values in common. The strongest way to express property (b) is that
A weaker way to express property (b), which is nonetheless sufficient for our second step, is the following: there exist mixed strategies σ i ∈ ∆(UD i (K i )) and σ i ∈ ∆(UD i ( K i )) that are sufficiently close, meaning that for any strategy subprofile s −i ∈ S −i , in the outcomes M (σ i , s −i ) and M ( σ i , s −i ), i's winning probability and price are close enough. This is the only place in our proof that relies on the finiteness of the pure strategy space S i .
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In the second step, we construct a candidate set profile K = (K 1 , . . . , K n ), a valuation profile θ ∈ K, and a strategy profile s ∈ UD(K) as follows.
For each player i, we first consider two possible δ-approximate candidate sets:
, where ε > 0 is some sufficiently small positive value, and v > 2δ. Since K i and K i overlap nontrivially, the first step applies. For simplicity, suppose that it implies the existence of a pure strategy 
A Structural Lemma
The following lemma applies to all finite mechanisms, including those that allow players to report sets of valuations, or anything else. . This leads to a contradiction if the set of pure strategies S i is finite. 26 As we are not dealing with dominant-strategy or ex-post Nash mechanisms, the revelation principle no longer holds, and thus we have no control on what the strategy spaces of the players might consist of.
In a mechanism M , for a (possibly mixed) strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ), denote by M A i,j (σ) the probability of player i winning j copies of the good, and by M P i (σ) the expected price that player i pays. Then, Lemma 6.1. Let M be a finite mechanism, i ∈ [n] a player, x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) two valuations in Θ i such that x j > y j for all j ∈ [m], and K i and K i two candidate sets for i such that,
Then, for every ε > 0, there are mixed strategies
The proof of Lemma 6.1 can be found in Appendix C.
Proof of Theorem 3
Arbitrarily choose two numbers v and ε such that v > 2δ and ε ∈ (0, δ), and let
For each player i, consider the following two δ-approximate candidate sets It is simple to verify that x, y, K i and K i satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1. Thus, for any ε > 0, we have
Consider the allocation of mechanism M under the strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n ).
Because there are m copies of the good, there ought to be one player who, in expec-tation, receives no more than m n copies. Without loss of generality, let him be player 1: that is,
. Thus, by (6.1) and multiple applications of the triangle inequality,
By averaging, there exists a pure strategy profile s = (s 1 , s −1 ) in the support of
Now let
Because we know (
deduce that s ∈ UD(K). It is also obvious that θ ∈ K, and MSW(θ) = mv.
We now show that s, K, and θ satisfy the desired inequality of Theorem 3. Indeed,
Above, inequality ( * ) holds because, when θ is the true-valuation profile, all players except player 1 value each copy of the good as v − 2δ + ε , while only player 1 values it as v. However, in the outcome M (s), player 1 can receive, in expectation, at most m n + ε m 2 copies of the good (cf. (6.2)).
Lastly, notice that ε > 0 and ε > 0 can both be arbitrarily small, so we can choose them to satisfy 2δε
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
Beyond Multi-Unit Auctions
As a social planner may never be certain about how precisely the players know their own preferences, the Knightian robustness of the Vickrey mechanism may be a welcome piece of news. A social planner' desiderata, however, go beyond social welfare in multi-unit auctions. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether or not Knightian robustness is enjoyed by other mechanisms in different settings.
So far, we have found the answer for provision of a public good (more generally, for single-parameter domains), and for unrestricted combinatorial auctions.
Knightian Single-Parameter Domains
In a classical single-parameter domain, there is a set A, the set of all possible allocations; for each player i there exists a publicly known subset S i ⊆ A; and the set of possible valuations for player i, Θ i , consists of all functions mapping A to the reals, subject to the following constraints: for each
We continue to denote the true valuation of player i by θ *
i . An outcome consists of an allocation and a price profile.
(The term "single-parameter" derives from the fact that each θ i ∈ Θ i coincides with a single number: i's value for, say, the lexicographically first element of S i . The term "classical" emphasizes that each player knows exactly his own true valuation.)
Single-parameter domains are general enough to include several settings of interest: in particular, provision of a public good 28 [Cla71] , bilateral trades [MS83] , and buying a path in a network [NR01] .
In a classical single-parameter domain, we say that a mechanism M is weakly dominant-strategy-truthful if for each player i:
Several weakly dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms have been proposed for classical single-parameter domains. (For a characterization of dominant-strategy truthfulness in such domains, see [AT01] .)
In this setting we again define Knightian self uncertainty by starting, for each player i, with a set of distributions for θ * i , and then considering their expected values.
Definition 7.1. In a single-parameter domain with Knightian valuation uncertainty, the only information that each player i has about the true valuation profile θ * consists of a set of reals,
Here, we prove the Knightian robustness of many mechanisms at once as follows.
Theorem 6.1. Let M be a weakly dominant-strategy-truthful mechanism for classical single-parameter domains. Then, in a domain with Knightian valuation uncertainty,
A proof of this theorem can be found in [CMZ14c] .
Theorem 6.1 is, for single-parameter domains, the counterpart of Lemma 4.1. That lemma implied that the social-welfare performance of the Vickrey mechanism in a δ-approximate multi-unit auction gracefully degrades with δ. Theorem 6.1 implies the same for the VCG mechanism in single-parameter domains. In particular, it implies that, when applied to the provision of a public good in the presence of n Knightian players, the VCG mechanism guarantees, in undominated strategies, a social welfare ≥ MSW − 2nδ. As another example, when applied to buying paths in a network, the VCG mechanism guarantees a social welfare ≥ MSW − 2mδ, where m is the number of edges in the network. Finally, we note that the proof of Theorem 6.1 easily extends to imply an analogous result for the VCG mechanism for single-minded combinatorial auctions, which are not quite single-parameter domains.
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More generally, Theorem 6.1 implies that, for all weakly dominant-strategy mechanisms M (which include those of [Cla71] , [MS83] , and [NR01] )
'the outcome M (θ) is sufficiently good whenever max i |θ i − θ * i | is sufficiently small'.
Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions
In an unrestricted combinatorial auction, there are n players and m distinct goods. 
In such auctions, the VCG mechanism guarantees efficiency in dominant strategies.
Definition 7.2. In an unrestricted combinatorial auction with Knightian valuation uncertainty, a player i's candidate set is a subset
For each subset of the goods
The auction is δ-approximate if each candidate set K i is δ-approximate.
It is immediately clear that, with Knightian valuation uncertainty, the VCG mechanism is no longer dominant strategy, and Theorem 1 can be extended to prove that no dominant strategy mechanism can guarantee social welfare greater that that obtainable by assigning the goods at random.The novelty, however, is that this time the social-welfare performance of the VCG mechanism is actually very poor. Namely, Theorem 6.2. In a δ-approximate combinatorial Knightian auction with n ≥ 2 players and m goods, the VCG mechanism cannot, in undominated strategies, guarantee social welfare greater than MSW − (2 m − 3)δ.
29 In such an auction, there are m distinct goods, and each player i values, positively and for the same amount θ * i , only the supersets of a given subset S i of the goods. This auction is not singleparameter because S i is private, that is, known solely to i. Accordingly, i's true valuation can be fully described only by the number θ * i and the subset S i . The VCG mechanism for single-minded auctions ensures, in undominated strategies, a social welfare that is at least MSW − 2 min{n, m}δ.
A proof of Theorem 6.2 can be found in [CMZ14a] .
The reason for the above poor social-welfare performance is that Theorem 6.1 does not extend to unrestricted Knightian combinatorial auctions, and the undominated strategies of the VCG mechanism can be very counterintuitive. For example, for a player i knowing that his true value for some subset of the goods T lies in some interval [x, x + δ], reporting a valuation θ i such that θ i (T ) is very far from [x, x + δ] can be an undominated strategy.
The Knightian fragility of the VCG mechanism in unrestricted combinatorial auctions may be disappointing, but then the latter auctions are difficult in many ways.
That said, in [CMZ14b] we extend the notion of regret to the Knightian valuation model, and prove that the social welfare performance of the VCG mechanism continues to be excellent if each player (1) chooses a regret-minimizing strategy, or (2) resorts to regret minimization only to further refine his set of undominated strategies, if needed.
Conclusions
The literature on auction design so far concentrated on players having ambiguous beliefs about the valuations of their opponents. We believe it natural to assume that such ambiguity may extend to a player's own valuation. We thus find it natural to investigate the performance of the Vickrey mechanism in such an environment, where it is no longer a dominant-strategy mechanism.
Fragility is inherent to sophisticated endeavors, which certainly include mechanism design. It is thus reasonable to expect that many mechanisms fail when their fundamental underlying assumptions do not exactly hold.
In multi-unit auctions, it is a fundamental assumption that the players know their own valuations. We have proven, however, that the classical Vickrey mechanism is robust and continues to perform very well even when the players have Knightian uncertainty about their own valuations. In fact, we have proven that the socialwelfare performance of the Vickrey mechanism is essentially optimal in Knightian undominated strategies.
In sum, as most things classical, the Vickrey mechanism outlives the confines in which it was conceived, and continues to be relevant in new and unforeseen settings.
Appendix

A Knightian Revelation Principle
Let us explicitly show that a version of the revelation principle [Gib73, DHM79, Mye79] holds also in the Knightian setting. We do so directly for auctions, so as not to introduce any additional notation.
Recall that K i is the set of possible candidate sets for player i.
Definition A.1. Let M be a mechanism; for each player i, let S i be the set of actions of i in M ; and let s i :
Then the function profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is an ex-post Nash equilibrium.
Lemma A.2 (Revelation Principle). Let M , S i for each player i, and s be as in Definition A.1. Then, there exists a Knightian DST mechanism M such that
Proof. Let M be the Knightian direct mechanism so defined:
(The above equality is between distributions if M is probabilistic.)
All that is left to prove is that mechanism M is dominant-strategy-truthful. To this end, let K i be the true candidate set of a player i. Then, for all K i ∈ K i , all
where the inequality follows from the definition of ex-post Nash by letting a i = s i (K i ).
This completes the proof.
Because every dominant-strategy mechanism is also ex-post Nash, the theorem holds also when M is dominant-strategy.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Let M be an arbitrarily chosen Knightian DST mechanism, and S i the set of pure strategies for player i. Recall that S i = K i is the set of all possible δ-approximate candidate sets.
We start by proving a separate claim. Namely, for every player i, fixing the candidate sets reported by his opponents, i's probability of winning the good does not change with the candidate sets he might report, as long as they share at least two valuations. More precisely, denoting by M A i (K) the probability that i wins the good under a profile of strategies (i.e., candidate sets) K, and by M P i (K) the expected price of i under K, Claim B.1. For every player i, every two candidate sets
, and every subprofile K −i of candidate sets for i's opponents,
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Proof of Claim B.1. Because the true candidate set of player i may coincide with K i , and because when this is the case reporting K i should dominate reporting K i , the following inequality holds:
Similarly, because the true candidate set of player i may coincide with K i , and because when this is the case reporting K i should dominate reporting K i , also the following inequality holds:
Now let us pick two valuations x, y ∈ K i ∩ K i such that x > y. Then, setting θ i = x in (B.1) and θ i = y in (B.2), and summing up (the corresponding terms 30 Although we do not care about prices, it is also the case that
of) the resulting inequalities, the M P i price terms cancel out, yielding the following inequality:
. Because x > y, the last inequality implies that
Similarly, setting θ i = y in (B.1) and θ i = x in (B.2), summing up the resulting inequalities, regrouping, and using again the fact x > y, we deduce that:
Together, inequalities (B.3) and (B.4) imply our claim.
Let us now prove a second claim. Namely, given any DST mechanism M , and any profile K = (K 1 , . . . , K n ) of candidate sets, there exists a player j ∈ [n] such that M is insensitive to j's report. That is, when j's opponents collectively report the subprofile K −j , j can report any set V j ∈ K j he wants, but cannot increase beyond 1/n his probability of getting the good.
Claim B.2. If K is a profile of δ-approximate candidate sets of cardinality greater than 1, then there exists j ∈ [n] so that, for every δ-approximate set V j ∈ K j of cardinality greater than 1,
Proof of Claim B.2. When the players report a profile of strategies K as in the state-
Next, let us consider a sequence of δ-approximate candidate sets
such that:
For instance, we can construct the above sequence as follows.
•
, and so on, until an interval intersecting K (k−1) j (on more than 1 value) is generated.
Then, invoking Claim B.1 for each ∈ [k], with i = j,
Let us now see that Theorem 1 holds, that is, let us see that
Apply 
C Proof of Lemma 6.1
It is a simple exercise to verify that the sets UD i (K i ) and UD i ( K i ) are both nonempty (but anyways proved in Appendix E). If there exists a common (pure) strategy
, then setting σ i = σ i = s i completes the proof. Therefore, let us assume that UD i (K i ) and UD i ( K i ) are totally disjoint. Accordingly, let s i be a pure strategy in
By definition, s i ∈ UD i ( K i ) implies the existence of a (possibly mixed) strategy
which is denoted by σ i (i, K i ) s i (see Definition 5.1).
Next, we argue that
i , where X is a finite index set, each s
is a pure strategy of UD i ( K i ), and t∈X α (t) = 1. Invoking again the disjointedness of UD i (K i ) and
This implies the existence of a strategy τ
i , (C.1) holds. Similarly, we could argue that there exists some τ i ∈ ∆(UD i ( K i )) such that
Continuing in this fashion, going back and forth between ∆(UD i (K i )) and ∆(UD i ( K i )), we obtain an infinite chain of strategies,
This (weak) dominance chain implies the following utility inequalities: for all s −i ∈ S −i and all k ∈ N:
Now, pick some t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m}, and let
For this choice of θ i and θ i , we see from (C.2) that for all s −i ∈ S −i and all k ∈ N
31 Note that, while we have only defined what it means for a pure strategy to be dominated by a possibly mixed one, the definition trivially extends to the case of dominated strategies that are mixed, as is the case in "τ i (i,K i ) σ i " in (C.1).
which then implies that for all s −i ∈ S −i and all k ∈ N
, s −i ) .
Considering the above inequalities for k = 1, 2, . . . , we get the following infinite and non-decreasing sequence of real numbers (for each s −i ∈ S −i ): Notice that, because the mechanism is finite and thus so is the set S −i , we can let
: s −i ∈ S −i , t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m} ∈ N .
Next, we pick arbitrarily k > H ε , and prove that σ Now we use triangle inequality again on (C.4) for t and t − 1, and deduce that:
That is, the first inequality of Lemma 6.1 has been proven. Let us now consider the price terms. We begin with a simple application of (C.5).
Using the fact that j l=1 z t,l ≤ X, we obtain,
Then, using the triangle inequality again, we get
Expressing the above inequality as |a − c| ≤ . Thus, we use the triangle inequality again and obtain
where the last inequality uses X ≥ 1 and D ≤ 1.
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.1.
32 That is, |a − b| ≤ ε and |c − d| ≤ ε imply |(a − b) − (c − d)| ≤ 2ε.
D Our Results for Multiplicative δ
As mentioned in Remark 3 of Section 3.2, when inaccuracy is measured in terms of a multiplicative δ (see Footnote 11), Theorems 1, 2 and 3 can be respectively reformulated as follows.
Theorem 1'. For all (possibly probabilistic) Knightian DST mechanisms M for singlegood auctions, and for all multiplicative δ > 0, there exist profiles K of δ-approximate candidate sets such that ∀θ ∈ K 1 × · · · × K n E SW(θ, M (K)) ≤ MSW(θ) n Theorem 2'. In a m-unit Knightian auction, for all multiplicative δ, all products K of δ-approximate candidate sets, all profiles v ∈ UD(K), and all θ ∈ K SW θ, Vickrey(v) ≥ 1 − δ 1 + δ 2 · MSW(θ) .
Theorem 3'. Let M be a finite mechanism in a δ-approximate multi-unit Knightian auction with n > 1 players and multiplicative δ > 0. Then, for every ε > 0, there exist products K of δ-approximate candidate sets, valuation profiles θ ∈ K, and undominated strategy profiles s ∈ UD(K), such that E SW(θ, M (s)) ≤ (1 − δ) 2 + 4δ n
(1 + δ) 2 · MSW(θ) + ε .
E The Set of Undominated Strategies is Non-Empty
It is trivial to see that, no matter what candidate set K i a player i may have,
is non-empty in the Vickrey mechanism. Indeed, for each θ i ∈ K i , θ i ∈ UD i (K i ).
We wish to point out that UD i (K i ) is non-empty for all finite mechanisms, a simple fact relied upon in the proof of Theorem 3. This fact is trivial if a Knightian player is restricted to consider only pure strategies, and not hard to prove when mixed strategies are allowed. As we shall see, the proof follows the analogous one for the classical setting, that is, when K i is a singleton.
Fact E.1. Let M be a finite mechanism, i a player, and K i a candidate set of i.
Then, UD i (K i ) = ∅.
for some α ∈ ∆ such that α 1 = α 2 = 0.
This process, quite similar to Gaussian elimination for linear systems, can be continued until we obtain s k ≺ (i,K i ) s t for every k = 1, . . . , t − 1. This implies that s t must be an undominated strategy for player i, contradicting the hypothesis that
